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Recent Decisions
CRIMINAL LAW - NEW TEST FOR INSANITY
IN FEDERAL COURTS
In spite of a long history of mental disorder and a psychiatrises testi-
mony to the effect that he was of unsound mind at the time of the act, de-
fendant was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's find-
Ing, that the inference of sanity had not been rebutted, and held instead that
the burden should have been shifted to the prosecution to show soundness
of mind beyond a reasonable doubt1
Making Durham v. United States2 its vehicle for the adoption of a new
test for criminal responsibility, the court held that the new test should be
used on retrial and in all future cases in the District of Columbia. The
rule adopted, similar to that followed by the courts of New Hampshire since
1870,s is simply that the accused will not be held criminally responsible if
the unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or defect.4
This rule provides that whenever some evidence is introduced to show
that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect when committing
the unlawful act in question, the jury will determine his criminal responsi-
bility.5 If the jury finds no causal relationship between the disease and the
act, the accused will be held responsible. The jury, in following this rule,
should have no more difficulty in making this determination than it does
in civil cases in which it is asked to determine- using medical testimony as
a basis -the effects of bodily injury upon total disability of a plaintiff.
Prior to the instant case, the courts of the District of Columbia had
followed the majority rule in the United States and England" in using the
'In Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (App. D.C. 1950) the verdict of the trial
court was reversed when less evidence was introduced than in the case at bar. The
only evidence introduced there tending to show unsoundness of mind was that of the
accused and three lay witnesses, which contradicted the testimony of two psychiatrists,
but the trial court erred in ruling that the burden was not shifted to the prosecution.
2 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (App. D.C. 1954).
'State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
'The court uses "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating, and "defect" in the sense of a condition which is
not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (App. D.C. 1954).
The court attempts to set out what it feels an instruction to the jury should convey.
Among the elements are the belief by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused suffered from such a mental condition as to be the efficient causal factor in
the crime. Of course it would not be binding in all cases. Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862, 875 (App. D.C. 1954).
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right-and-wrong test first enunciated in England in M'Naghten's Case.7
Because of the great interest in the case, the House of Lords, in 1843, asked
the opinion of fifteen judges of England on the law governing such cases.
The rules laid down by the judges required that the accused be aware of the
nature and quality of the act, and that he be capable of distinguishing be-
tween right and wrongs These standards comprise the sole test of criminal
responsibility used in England9 and in twenty-nine American states.10
A second test, irresistible impulse," is used to modify the right-and-
wrong test in at least fourteen states and in the federal courts.' 2 Under
this modification, the accused is held not responsible if he does not know
the wrongfulness of the act, or if he does know that it is wrong, that he
cannot control the impulse to commit it. Ohio courts use the right-and-
wrong test' 3 as modified by the irresistible impulse test.'"
However poor these rules are for testing criminal responsibility, courts
have continued their use, with all the stubborn tenacity that precedent can
imply, even though psychiatry has progressed far beyond the point it had
reached by 1843. From a limited study of the critics of the tests, it can
be said that the greatest objection to them is that they fail to take into
consideration the total mental picture of the accused, and in so doing greatly
limit the psychiatric expert in his testimony.'5 Under the new rule the
expert witness will no longer be limited in the scope of his testimony, by
T M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200 (1843).
' For a critical study of M'Naghten's Case and the answers of the judges arising
therefrom see GLUECK, MENTAL DIsoRDER AND THE CRAINAL LAW 161-186
(1925).
'Rex v. True, 16 Crim. App. 164 (1922); Rex v. Quarmby, 15 Crim. App. 163
(1921).
"Ariz., Cal., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Md., Minn., Miss., Mo., Neb.,
Nev., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Wash., W. Va.,
and Wis. In six of these states the right and wrong test is established by statute.
La., LA. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 14 (1950); Minn., MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 610.08,
610.10 (1947); N.Y., N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 1120 (1944); N.D., N.D. REV. CODE
§ 12-0502 (1943); Okla., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 152(4), 154; tit. 22 5
1161 (1937); and S.D., S.D. CODE §5 13.0505, 34.2001 (1939).
'For historical development of this test in the United States see Weihofen, supra
note 7, at 85.
" Ala., Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., D.C., Ill., Ind., Ky., Mass., Mich., Utah., Vt., Va.,
and Wyo.
'State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868 (1948); Loeffner v. State, 10
Ohio St. 598 (1857); Yankulav v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497, 77 N.E.2d 88
(1945).
1 State v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77 (1952); Clark v. State, 23 Ohio
App. 474, 156 N.E. 219 (1926).
"GUTrMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYcHIATRY AND THE LAW 402, 407, 408, 421
(1952); HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRiMINAL LAw 481 (1947); 12 THE SHINGLE
79 (1949).
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